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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
future, an interesting set of sequels should result. If the rules,
on the other hand, are confined to "goose cases," some finely knit
logic of distinction will have to be produced.
PROPERTY
Joseph Dainow*
In the case of Dickson v. Board of Commissioners of Caddo
Levee District,' a riparian proprietor claimed damages sustained
by his property through erosion. This erosion was the result of
an artificial current which had been created in the river and
thrown against his plantation at a right angle when defendants
made two straight channels, or cut-offs, across two bends of the
river above plaintiff's property. The court's opinion, rendered
by Justice Fournet, contains a clear and interesting history of
the servitude under Article 665 of the Revised Civil Code2 which
is imposed on riparian properties for levee purposes. From the
construction of the first levees by the French in 1727, through
the Spanish regime, and until 1878, the matter of flood control
was an obligation on the riparian proprietors. Accordingly, when
flood control became a governmental function, it was a consid-
erable relief of responsibility even though the land remained
subject to the use without compensation. The beneficent estab-
lishment of compensation-in 1898 for Orleans," and in 1921 for
the whole state4-did not alter the nature of the servitude; and
the levee districts are invested by statute with complete au-
thority for the determination, construction and maintenance of
flood control works. In the present case, the actions of the de-
fendant were properly performed for the preservation of exist-
ing levees, and the plaintiff's only recourse would be to claim the
compensation allowed under the constitution for lands taken,
used or destroyed. Since the plaintiff was not making this kind of
claim, and his action did not meet the requirement of such a
claim, the defendant's exception of no cause of action was main-
tained and the suit dismissed.
In the case of Breaux v. Lefort' a group of plaintiffs claimed
ownership of a tract of land. Their predecessors had instituted
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 210 La. 121, 26 So. (2d) 474 (1946).
2. For texts of corresponding articles in prior civil codes, see Compiled
Edition of the Civil Codes of Louisiana, p. 383.
3. La. Const. (1898) Art. 312.
4. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XVI, § 6.
5. 209 La. 506, 24 So. (2d) 879 (1946).
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proceedings prior to 1812 to acquire the land and to obtain the
United States patent which was issued in due course on June
27, 1934. The defendant shows uninterrupted possession for over
thirty years and a chain of title back to a notarial deed in 1840.
The question is whether the land, prior to 1934, was public do-
main and imprescriptible, or whether it was private property
and subject to prescription. The latter view had been the basis
of decision in the earlier case of Jopling v. Chacherer and the
court here followed the same principle. Accordingly, the patent
issued in 1934 established the patentee's title as of an earlier
date which would not be later than January 23, 1858, when the
official plat was filed and approved. Consequently, the defen-
dant's pleas of acquisitive prescription of ten and thirty years
were sustained.
A somewhat similar problem regarding property acquired
by state patent was presented in Douglas v. State.7 By special
statutory authorization,8 this suit was filed against the State of
Louisiana for money received by the state from a mineral lease
on land owned by plaintiff. This mineral lease was awarded on
March 8, 1939. Although the plaintiff's patent was not issued
until May 28, 1941, it was based upon a warrant issued under
the provisions of Act 104 of 1888 and an application dated Febru-
ary 19, 1919 (renewed on February 3, 1939). The plaintiff and
her predecessors had done everything that was required to ob-
tain the land which had been bought and paid for, and the court
held that a vested right had been acquired since there remained
nothing more to be done than the ministerial duty of the register
of the land office to issue the necessary formal documents. Ac-
cordingly, the plaintiff was granted judgment for the cash bonus
which had been received by the state under the mineral lease.
There is one disturbing factor in the reported decision of
this case, namely, the use (by the district court judge, quoted
with approval by supreme court) of the common law terms
"equitable interest" and "equitable title" to describe the plain-
tiff's rights in the property prior to the issuance of the patent.
Justice Fournet does soften the harshness of any possible im-
plications by adding that there is no intent "to create a new
system of law with respect to the ownership of real estate in
this state," but simply a conclusion that the plaintiff's right be-
6. 107 La. 522, 32 So. 243 (1902); affirmed 192 U. S. 94, 24 S. Ct. 214, 48
L.Ed. 359 (1904).
7. 208 La. 650, 23 So. (2d) 279 (1945).
8. La. Act 52 of 1944.
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came complete as a vested right on the basis of the earlier war-
rant and the applications of 1919 and 1939. Since the application
of the common law concept of equitable title was thus disavowed,
and indeed would have been improper, it is regrettable that the
term was used so frequently and completely by the trial judge
and quoted with approval by the supreme court to describe the
legal situation involved in the case. This is not to imply that
there should have been any different decision, nor that our law
is so perfect that it need not make any improvements by borrow-
ing. However, the common law doctrine of equitable title ex-
tends to a great many situations within the system of law known
as equity; and it is both desirable and necessary to avoid the
use of such terms, even where the description is accurate, because
there are many other situations which also fit the description
without producing the same results in Louisiana law.
An application to homestead certain property in the city of
New Orleans under Louisiana Act 235 of 1938 evoked an inter-
pretation of this statute in State ex rel. City of New Orleans v.
Grace9 The property is located in an industrial area of the city
and is known as commercial property; it is in use by a sawmill
and lumberyard, a junkyard and'some tenements. The court en-
joined the granting of the homestead application on the ground
that the homestead statute did not apply to such land. The sta-
tutory language of "actual settlement and cultivation" and "re-
sided upon and cultivated" and "continuous cultivation and im-
provement for the full period of 5 years" clearly indicates the
purpose and scope of the homestead law. A commercial property,
such as here involved, is completely outside the statutory con-
templation of the establishment of a home and the serious culti-
vation of the land. Even if the homestead application had been
granted, the applicant would not have acquired any vested rights
in the property because the title remains in the state until the
statutory conditions are all satisfied.0
Since the discovery of oil in areas which are, or were, or are
alleged to have been at one time, under water, there has been a
lot of litigation concerning the ownership of property to which
nobody had given much thought for a very long time. The state
is a party in many of these actions because of its ownership of
the beds of navigable rivers and streams, Accordingly, the issue
in such cases is a factual rather than a legal one; and since the
9. 209 La. 669, 25 So. (2d) 301 (1946).
10. Armstrong v. Dantont, 19 So. (2d) 293, 294 (La. App. 1944).
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time as to which such determination has to be made is 135 years
ago (1812) the decision must often be based on geological de-
ductions or legal presumptions. Thus, in Begnaud v. Grubb and
Hawkins," the dispute between the individual and the state de-
pended on whether Bayou Sale had been navigable in 1812 when
Louisiana became a state. It is not navigable now, and after con-
sideration of much testimony-scientific, technical and lay-the
court concluded that the preponderance of the evidence indi-
cated that the bayou was not navigable in 1812.
In Transcontinental Petroleum Corporation v. The Texas
Company12 the plaintiffs claimed mineral rights under a lease from
the state in an area which was not under water but which plain-
tiff alleged had been the bed of a navigable waterway in 1812.
The court heard and considered a great amount of scientific and
lay evidence, and contradictory but interesting theories and de-
ductions; and concluded that the plaintiff had not discharged
the burden of proving navigability in 1812. This must be taken
to mean that the party alleging a condition in 1812 different from
the present actual condition has the burden of proof with regard
to this matter, irrespective of whether he is cast as plaintiff or
defendant.
The question of navigability was side-stepped in O'Brien v.
State Mineral Board8 because the court decided the case in favor
of the plaintiff on the ground that he had a good title derived
from the state in a patent covering the area in question, and
under Act 62 of 1912, the state had lost any right to attach the
patent.
AGENCY
Robert A. Pascal*
American Guaranty Company v. Sunset Realty Company'
was a successful attempt to annul a sale of oil lands on grounds
of fraud. Only the agency aspects of the case will be considered
here and for this purpose the facts may be stated as follows: One
Small learned of activity by the Texas Company ("Texas") on
lands in the Paradis oil field adjacent to that apparently owned
by Sunset Realty & Planting Company, Incorporated ("Sunset"),
a subsidiary of Hibernia Bank & Trust Company, in Liquidation
11. 209 La. 826, 25 So. (2d) 606 (1946).
12. 209 La. 52, 24 So. (2d) 248 (1945).
13. 209 La. 266, 24 So. (2d) 470 (1945).
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 208 La. 772, 23 So. (2d) 409 (1944).
1947]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
("Hibernia"). Small then contracted with Sunset to purchase a
fraction of the mineral rights in this land, subject to examina-
tion of title. Small discovered outstanding title in American
Guaranty Company ("American"). On being notified of this
fact, both Sunset and its lessee, Texas, agreed to give Small frac-
tions of their interests if he would obtain a quitclaim from Am-
erican. Small did so and later transferred to Sunset and Texas.
Hibernia had accepted a mortgage on Sunset's land as security
for a loan and also joined in the act so as to subordinate Sun-
set's new record title to the mortgage. The State Bank Commis-
sioner ("Commissioner") joined in the act to approve Hibernia's
action. The quitclaim from American to Small was declared null
because of fraud on the part of Small. The next questions were
the effects of the declaration of nullity as toSunset, Texas, Hi-
bernia, and the Commissioner.
Sunset and Hibernia claimed they were third parties acquir-
ing from Small as record owner and therefore any annulment of
the act between American and Small could not affect their in-
terests. The facts clearly established the agency between Sunset
and Texas as principals and Small as agent and the court ig-
nored the mechanics of the acquisition by Sunset and Texas.
Certainly Small had acted for Sunset and Texas and, eliminating
the fraud issue, they could have been recognized judicially as
the actual parties at interest had Small failed to transfer the
property to them pursuant to their agreement.
Hibernia and the Commissioner, interested in protecting Hi-
bernia's mortgage, similarly contended they had, by the act of
subordination, accepted the mortgage in reliance on the public
records showing Small as owner and his transfer to their mort-
gagor, Sunset. Here the court declared that Hibernia and the
Commissioner, even if at the time ignorant of Small's fraud, by
entering into the act of subordination had "ratified" Small's act
and by such "ratification" had made him their agent! On this
basis, the court concluded that the "principals" could not take
advantage of the "agent's" acts and could not avail themselves
of the transfer from American to Small to give validity to the
mortgage.
The result is just, for Sunset was a subsidiary of Hibernia
and the Commissioner could not have a greater interest than
Hibernia; but it should have been based on other grounds than
a finding of a principal-agency relation, for Hibernia as an entity
had no dealings with Small. Perhaps the penetration of the cor-
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porate fiction would have sufficed, or a handling of the matter
on a mortgage basis. With regard to the latter, it is interesting
to note that, had the transfers from American to Small to Sunset
been valid, Hibernia would have benefited from them without
an act of subordination, 2 subject only to rights of third persons
acquired on the face of the public records.8 Hence, Hibernia's
purpose in the act of subordination was only to make clear record
of a mortgage it already held, not to create a new mortgage, and
it could have no greater rights under the subordination than it
had under the original mortgage.
Latter & Blum, Incorporated v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company4 was a suit by a real estate broker, against both seller
and purchaser, for a fee on a building transaction. The suit
against the seller was based primarily on an alleged employment
and alternatively on quantum meruit; that against the purchaser
-itself an alternative to the demand against the seller-on
quantum meruit and alternatively on tort.
From the facts, it was clear that the broker, learning of the
seller's desire to sell and acting with a view to remuneration,
had interested the purchaser in the prospective transaction. The
purchaser had authorized the broker to offer as much as $1,200,000
for the building in question. The broker failed to transfer the
offer to the proper representative of the seller and had given
the purchaser reason to believe the offer had been rejected.
Later the purchaser made the offer to the seller through a third
party and the seller accepted. The court cound there was no
contractual relationship between the plaintiff and either defen-
dant and denied recovery on quantum meruit because the brok-
er's activity was not the "procuring cause" of the sale. It also
denied the existence of tort on the basis that the purchaser had
just ground to believe the negotiations between him and the
plaintiff had terminated before he sought the bargain through a
third person.
The decision seems correct. Ordinarily, even the mere fact
of creating an interest in a purchaser should warrant remunera-
tion under negotiorum gestio.5 This should be true even if the
broker expects payment for his services.6 Article 2299 of the Civil
2. Art. 3304, La. Civil Code of 1870.
3. Art. 3342, La. Civil Code of 1870.
4. 208 La. 490, 23 So. (2d) 193 (1945).
5. Arts. 2295-2300, La. Civil Code of 1870.
6. Such, at least, is the result reached in France under articles similar
to those of our law. See Picord, La gestion d'affaires dans la jurisprudence
19471
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Code, however, allows -remuneration if the business "has been
well managed." A reading of the opinion leaves one free to con-
clude that the broker had acted in a manner which appeared to
him to be his own best interest, rather than that of the seller or
purchaser.
IV. TORTS AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Wex S. Malone*
TORTS
A varied assortment of torts and workmen's compensation
cases was handed down by the supreme court during the past
term. Several of them were restricted to controversies of fact
and do not lend themselves readily to treatment.1 Other decisions
are sufficiently significant to merit comment. But it cannot be
said that the latest crops of cases has produced anything of start-
ling importance.
Traffic and Transportation
The Louisiana courts have often had occasion to comment
on the duty of a motorist who, having the right of way, never-
theless proceeds without regard for the safety of those who have
entered or are about to enter the intersection from a less favored
thoroughfare.2 However, until the recent decision in Kientz v.
Charles Dennery, Inc.,3 the supreme court had not dealt with the
situation presented where traffic lights determine the right of
way. The presence of "stop" and "go" signals alters the picture
slightly. Anyone who approaches an intersection against the light
knows that to proceed further is an arbitrary violation of the
law. He cannot discharge his duty simply by "reasonably giving
contemporaire (1921) 20 Rev. Prim. de droit civil 419, 458-461; and 7 Planiol
et Ripert, Trait6 Pratique de droit civil francais (1931) n. 731.
' Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Burns v. Evans Cooperate Co., Inc., 208 La. 406, 23 So.(2d) 165 (1945)
(plaintiff, a motorist, left road and was injured when defendant's car ahead
made a sudden turn to the left without signal. Evidence indicated plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence under the circumstances in attempt-
ing to pass.); Hebert v. Meibaum, 209 La. 156, 24 So.(2d) 297 (1945) (pedes-
trian struck by defendant's car while attempting to cross at street inter-
section. Evidence showed plaintiff precipitated himself suddenly in path of
vehicle, and there was no opportunity for defendant to stop); Pool v. Gaudin,
209 La. 218, 24 So.(2d) 383 (1945) (Defendant charged with defamation in
accusing plaintiff of refusing to pay his share of his mother's funeral ex-
penses. The case turned on the property implication to be drawn from the
accusing letter).
2. See Comment (1946) 5 LouisNA LAw Rvinw 432, 434-438.
3. 209 La. 144, 24 So.(2d) 292 (1945).
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